

## Medical Errors Management and Early Warning for the Medical Physicist

David Hinterlang, University of Florida



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## Types of "Errors"

- Human errors vs.
- Medical errors vs.
- Medical events


*To err is human, to forgive is divine...*

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## Approaches of other industries:

- Nuclear Power
- Aviation
- Cruise Ship Industry



## Commercial Aviation Safety

- High profile accidents
- Long period of experience and study
- Evolutionary changes in culture
- Enviably safety record

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## Concepts applicable to Health Care and Medical Physics

- Review and analysis of incidents
- Emphasis on team coordination
- Procedural tools
- Identification of Error Chains

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## Review and Analysis of Incidents

- Learning from experience
- Regulatory reporting requirements
- Centralized repository
- Incentivized no-fault reporting
- Analysis
- Dissemination

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## Required Reporting of Major Incidents

Aviation	Radiology/Radiation Therapy
Federal Aviation Administration	Medical Events: State/NRC
National Transportation Safety Board	Sentinel Events: Joint Commission

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## Centralized Reporting of Incidents

Aviation	Radiology/Radiation Therapy
Federal Aviation Administration	
National Transportation Safety Board	
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	

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## Voluntary No-Fault Reporting

Aviation	Radiology/Radiation Therapy
NASA – Aviation Safety Reporting System	

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## Incentivized No-Fault Reporting

- ASRS – Aviation Safety Reporting System
- Voluntary reporting
- Maintains confidentiality
- Analyzes data
- Disseminates to Community

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## Elements of Safety Reporting System

- Voluntary Submission
- Submitters identity is confidential
- Incentive – Immunity from enforcement actions
- Encompasses all stakeholders
- Basis for human factors research
  - (source of 2/3 incidents)

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- Not limited to regulatory violations
- Includes incidents / near misses
- Observations of unsafe practice

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## Parallels in Medical Physics?

- Need recognized and discussed at various meetings
- AAPM recognizes the need
- Working with ASTRO and others towards addressing the need

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## AAPM Response to NY Times Article (March 2011)

- In summary, AAPM believes that patient safety in the use of medical radiation will be increased through:.....; a consistent and accessible national event reporting/recording system; and .....

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## In Development ?

- Patient Dose Index Registry
- NASA has a version of ASRS available to health care professionals - PSRS

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**psrs**  
Patient Safety Reporting System

Welcome to the PSRS

PROGRAM OVERVIEW | REPORTING FORM | PUBLICATIONS | FAQ'S | HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT | SERVICES | CONTACT US

See it. Report it.  
Make a difference.

The Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS) is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive reporting system available to collaborate with both private and federal medical facilities.

View the PSRS Tutorial  
Watch the 4 minute tutorial

Reporting Form  
See example form here

FEEDBACK  
View sample issues of our free quarterly newsletter

PROGRAM OVERVIEW | REPORTING FORM | PUBLICATIONS | FAQ'S | HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT | SERVICES | CONTACT US  
PSRS Website Administrator: Mariana Carmona | NASA/PSRS Director: Linda Connell | Last Updated: February 26, 2010  
NASA Privacy Statement | NASA Home | NASA Ames

**Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS) Report Form**

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: Please do not remove. This number will be referenced by you and recorded on a log kept by your agency. (OPTIONAL: PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR AGENCY REPORT NUMBER.)

TELEPHONE NUMBER: where we may reach you for further details of this incident.

NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS: to which you want your contribution of report money mailed. (PLEASE PRINT A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT OR SITUATION YOU ARE REPORTING.)

ADDRESS / PO BOX: \_\_\_\_\_

CITY: \_\_\_\_\_ STATE: \_\_\_\_\_ ZIP: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE OF OCCURRENCE: \_\_\_\_\_ LOCAL TIME (24 hr. clock): \_\_\_\_\_

INTENTIONALLY OMITTED ACTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PSRS PROGRAM. YOUR NAME IS IMPORTANT TO YOUR ID EMPLOYMENT AND TO ALL OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT. PLEASE PRINT YOUR COMPLETE NAME AND EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION.

PLEASE FILL IN SPACES AND CHECK BOXES BELOW YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION YOU ARE REPORTING.

**REPORTER INFORMATION AND EVENT BACKGROUND**

What is your current position?  Administration (Finance, HR, Patient Safety, etc.)  Physician (MD, DO)  Nurse (RN, LPN, etc.)  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

How many years of health care experience do you have? \_\_\_\_\_

What type of facility?  Hospital (Inpatient, E.O.)  Outpatient Facility  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

How many years have you worked at your facility? \_\_\_\_\_

What was your scheduled shift?  8 hours  All hours on  12 hours  24 hours on  24 hours off

These means (check all that apply) were you involved in the event?  Directly  Indirectly  Not involved

Your participation in event:  Initiated  Reported  Witnessed, not involved  Not involved, heard of or advised of event

This event occurred at:  Inpatient  Outpatient  Change of shift

**EVENT LOCATION**

Where did the event occur?  Patient Room  Waiting Room  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Where from any emergency situation that may have contributed to the event (e.g., fire, lightning, noise, etc.)?  No  Yes: \_\_\_\_\_

Were there any IT hardware or software issues that may have contributed to the event (equipment malfunction, computer system down, etc.)?  No  Yes: \_\_\_\_\_

**OTHER FACTORS**

Were there any IT hardware or software issues that may have contributed to the event (equipment malfunction, computer system down, etc.)?  No  Yes: \_\_\_\_\_

**EVENT DESCRIPTION — GO TO NEXT PAGE:**

## Centralized Reporting System provides

- Honest indicators of industry performance
- Evaluation of trends and management
- Opportunity to learn from “our” mistakes – without making them

## Emphasis on Team Coordination

- Maximize team & system
- Reduces individual importance
- Safety is not a solely individual responsibility

## Team Effort

- Human Factors
- Reduces the consequences of “rogue” personalities

**NEW DETAILS:**

150m-long gash on left side of ship caused by striking rocks

**Route of Costa Concordia**

**TIMELINE**

- 1 Jan 13, 7pm: Costa Concordia departs Civitavecchia. Route set electronically before leaving port
- 8:00pm: Captain makes unauthorized departure from intended route
- 8:30pm: Ship strikes rocks 300m from Giglio, rapidly begins taking on water
- 9:50pm: Ship begins to list as captain tries to turn vessel around towards Giglio harbour
- 10pm: Ship runs aground, small pieces fly upwind

## CRM – Crew Resource Management

- Utilized to minimize human error
- Optimizes use of available resources, equipment, procedures & people
- Emphasis
  - Not on technical knowledge and skill
  - Cognitive and interpersonal skills
- Interpersonal communication
- Leadership
- Decision making

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## CRM Strategies & Tools

- Flatten hierarchical order
  - Enhanced feedback by junior team members to senior members
  - First names used during normal procedures
  - Alternating roles
  - Common Knowledge
- Responsibility: shifts from individual to corporate organization

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
## CRM for Healthcare

- Recognized benefits are being adapted to healthcare
- Books and Pamphlets
- Commercial Training Courses



CRM Rating for Each Unit

Average ratings  
Scale: 1 = poor ... 5 = excellent



## Procedural Tools & Discipline

- Training
- Checklists
- Sterile Console (Cockpit)

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## Training

- Organizational responsibility
  - CRM and oversight of individual
- Recurrent training
  - Licensure
  - MOC
  - "Applications" or service engineers
- Restricted duties enforced by organization for those lacking
- Other members of health care team?

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## Checklists

- Ensure proper order and execution of complex procedures
- Types
  - Memory aid
  - Read and Do
  - Challenge and Response
- AAPM Working Group on Checklists

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### ROBERT BOISSONNEAULT ONCOLOGY INSTITUTE HDR TREATMENT REVIEW/PHYSIC SERVICE

Charts of patients receiving high dose rate brachytherapy (HDR) are reviewed by physics after each treatment fraction to ensure that the treatment was carried out in accordance with the written directive and that all facets of the HDR quality management program were followed.

Patient Name: \_\_\_\_\_ No. \_\_\_\_\_

FRACTION NUMBER	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Date of treatment fraction										
Patient Name verified by two methods										
Patient ID: Face Photo in Chart										
Prescription clear, complete and signed by physician (on Three Sheet and Rx page)										
Indorse Rx page corresponds with written directive										
Source activity at implant date (compare and HDR unit pointer) agrees with declared activity from calibration date										
Step size on indorse plan agrees with treatment step size										
Number of catheters planned = Number of catheters treated										
Calculated dwell times at each position (plus equally treatment dwell times on pointer)										
Total treatment time calculated (plus machine total treatment time displayed on pointer)										
Reference Distance is appropriate for implant type, Standard length 100 for Long, 150 for Gray, 120 for Lapring										
Length of indorse to dwell position 1 agrees (plus vs. 0s pointer)										
Indorse plan signed by the physician										
Treatment pointer signed by the physician										
Double check form in chart agrees with total treatment time to within 0.05%										
Negative patient survey documented after treatment complete										
Confers presence of ball on container, long strips										
Reviewed By										
Date										

acceptable   
  N/A = not applicable   
  Note = note sent to appropriate person

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## To be useful:

- Readily available
- Thoughtfully reviewed
- Requires more than a rote check or click of a mouse

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## Sterile Cockpit Rule

- Refrain from non-essential talk during critical operations
- Designed to eliminate unnecessary distractions
- Many control consoles are burdened with distractions (i.e. phones)

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## Lessons Learned from Review

- Accidents/Errors rarely are the result of a single unrecoverable event.
- Evolve through a series of events – Error Chain
- Typically there is ample opportunity to
  - Recognize a developing error chain
  - Break a link of the error chain

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- Accidents/Events only infrequently are the result of a single cause




- Most have multiple root causes, or are the result of a combination of events.

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## Error Chain

- Series of *independent* events that contribute to a dangerous condition.
- Clearly there are many combinations best characterized after the fact.



Recognition of these patterns or events.

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## Eastern Flight 401, 1972



- New York to Miami flight, uneventfully approaching Miami
- Landing gear extended on approach
- Landing checklist : Captain notices nose gear down light not illuminated
- Gear lever position verified
- Instructed to go-around, raised gear, circled and climb to 2000 ft

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- Flight Engineer troubleshooting light
- Autopilot engaged at 2000 ft so Captain can investigate
- First officer further disassembled bulb fixture
- Flight Engineer verifies gear down
- Autopilot disengaged (inadvertant override)
- descended at 200 fpm to 900 ft., Called by ATC
- Radio altimeter alarms
- Aircraft impacts Everglades with total break-up



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## CRM Failure?

- 3 man crew fixation on minor problem
- Plane was flyable – yet no one was flying it!

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## Opportunities to break the Error Chain?

- Designate one individual to work on problem, someone to fly the plane
- Ignore once gear verified down
- ATC notification of altitude loss
- Less cockpit activity would not have disengaged autopilot
- Maintain situational awareness

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## ASRS Report

- GA Aircraft gear did not retract on take-off
- Pilots cycled gear handle
- Checked circuit breakers, electrical busses, etc.
- Initially one pilot was flying, one working on problem
- Soon both were working on the problem
- Senior pilot recalled parallel to Flt 401 and recognized no one was actually flying.
- Error Chain broken and an uneventful landing was made

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## Medical Events

FI 2008-2011



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## Wrong Patient Case

- Patient identified (correctly) and escorted to vault by Therapist 1
- Patient initiated discussion of next patient with Therapist 1
- Therapist 1 inadvertently selects patient record of next patient at workstation
- Therapist 1 takes a phone call
- Therapist 2 continues
- 3 of 4 fiducials closely aligned
- Therapist 2 treats without checking patient data in room, or on console.

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## CRM Failure?

- Distractions
- Changes in normal procedure
- Lack of situational awareness

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## Opportunities to break the Error Chain?

- Designate one individual to deliver the treatment
- Minimize distractions (sterile console)
- Therapist 2 had a prime opportunity to verify patient ID
  - Re-initiate and complete the checklist
- Maintain situational awareness
- Alert! – normal procedure disturbed!

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## Another Wrong Patient Case

- Therapist sets up for scheduled Pt
- Scheduled Pt goes to restroom
- Pt 2 shows up 1.5 hr early
- Therapist calls for Pt 1, Pt 2 responds
  - Patient photos look similar
  - English not native language of either
  - Both have prostate treatment markings
- Pt 2 Treated

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## Opportunities to break the Error Chain?

- Two forms of positive patient ID
- Use open ended questioning
- Similar patients – Flag for caution

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## Yet another Wrong Patient Case

- Power outage locked-out MLC
- Physicist rebooted and tested with a “random” patient file
- Physicist did not close file
- Therapists continued treatment after timeout without verifying patient name on record

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## Error Chain

- Initiated by unusual event
- Physicist – close file
- Timeout – should restart procedure along with checks

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## Common Themes resulting in Events

- Most often result when an unexpected procedural change occurs.
- Assumptions regarding the situation are made but not verified (fly the plane)

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- Facilities have good procedures but may not follow them
  - Staff attempting to maintain schedule
  - Considered to be redundant
- Checklists – required completion
- Organizational culture emphasizing procedure

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## Some Error Chain Initiators

- Any Unusual Event
  - change of normal procedure
  - distraction
  - interrupted procedures
- Time pressures



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## Breaking the Error Chain

- Disciplined approach
- Awareness & objectivity
- Heightened awareness can break the chain
- Prioritize courses of action & consequences

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## Summary Learning from Past Mistakes

- Need a centralized reporting mechanism for events and “close-calls”
- Analysis of those events
- Dissemination
- Cultural Awareness

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## Acknowledgements

- Don Steiner and Tom Tomczak, Bureau of Radiation Control, Florida Department of Health
- Robert Boissenault Oncology Institute

## Resource

- NASA – Patient safety Reporting System: [www.psrp.aq.nasa.gov](http://www.psrp.aq.nasa.gov)

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